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HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?   
DIRECTOR EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND ITS ROLE  
IN THE INDEPENDENCE ASSESSMENT 
Joseph P. Farano∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fallout of the Enron debacle spurred legislative and regula-
tory activity aimed at strengthening corporate governance and pre-
venting another corporate implosion.1  Confronting shattered inves-
tor confidence, Congress responded to these corporate governance 
fiascos by enacting the now infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), meanwhile, called 
on the self-regulatory organizations (SROs),3 specifically the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq, to re-examine and 
strengthen their own listing and corporate governance standards, in 
particular those related to the qualifications of directors and officers.4  
In response, the SROs enacted comprehensive reforms to their cor-
porate governance provisions, designed to “restore investor confi-
dence by . . . ensuring the independence of directors and strengthen-
ing corporate-governance practices.”5
 ∗ J.D., 2007, summa cum laude, Seton Hall University School of Law; Associate, 
Fried Frank, New York.  The author would like to thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn 
and Jason Haller for their invaluable guidance. 
 1 Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Road-
map to Corporate Governance Reform, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 989 (2003). 
 2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 3 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. are 
generally acknowledged as the nation’s two largest stock markets.  See, e.g., Kate Kelly, 
Big Board May Buy American Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at C1. 
 4 Press Release, SEC, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate Governance Conduct Codes 
(Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt. 
 5 Press Release, NYSE, Inc., NYSE Files Changes to Listing Standards with SEC: 
NYSE-Approved Measures Aim to Strengthen Corporate Accountability (Aug. 16, 
2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1044027444694.html; Press Release, 
NASDAQ, Inc., Nasdaq Proposes Improvements to Corporate Governance Standards 
to Benefit Investors (Apr. 12, 2002), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/Newsroom 
/news/pr2002/ne_section02_084.html. 
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Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the new SRO regulations prescribe an 
agenda of greater independence, although they take different ap-
proaches and focus on different areas.  Sarbanes-Oxley focuses on the 
independence of company auditors and an audit committee of inde-
pendent directors to oversee the independent auditors.6  The SROs 
took a broader approach by creating independence criteria for a ma-
jority of the board and affirmatively requiring a compensation com-
mittee and a nominating/corporate governance committee (“nomi-
nating committee”), each comprised entirely of independent 
directors.7  Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the SROs provide certain objec-
tive criteria to aid in the assessment of a director’s independence.  
For example, both prohibit directors who are also executive officers 
from claiming independence.8  The criteria they provide, however, 
are inconsistent in their approach to equity ownership by directors.   
Sarbanes-Oxley creates a safe harbor for non-employee directors 
holding ten percent of the company equity, but directors holding 
over that amount cannot claim the safe harbor.9  The SROs, however, 
eschew thresholds in favor of conflicting guidance in their rule com-
mentary that simultaneously highlights and downplays equity owner-
ship as a factor affecting independence.10  Consequently, the role that 
stock ownership should play in the independence assessment is un-
clear.11
This Comment considers the role of equity ownership from the 
perspective of the SROs’ goals, and takes the position that equity 
ownership, if it should play any role in the independence assessment, 
should weigh solely in favor of finding independence.  While many of 
the arguments made here may be equally applicable to assessing the 
 6 148 CONG. REC. H1540, 1540–41 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Sessions) (Sarbanes-Oxley sought to “ensure auditor independence . . . [and] in-
crease corporate disclosure and responsibility”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 
10A(m) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004)) (requiring 
board audit committees to be comprised entirely of independent directors). 
 7 See generally NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A (2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_section.html (select “Section 3 Corporate Responsi-
bility,” then select “303A.00 Corporate Governance Standards”) [hereinafter NYSE 
Manual] (setting out the Corporate Governance Standards); NASDAQ, Inc., Nasdaq 
Manual Online § 4350(c) (2006), available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq 
/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 [hereinafter NASDAQ Manual] 
(setting out the Qualitative Listing Requirements for Nasdaq Issuers, provisions relat-
ing to independence of directors). 
 8 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m); NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A; NASDAQ Manual, 
supra note 7, § 4200(a)(15). 
 9 See infra Part II.A. 
 10 See infra Part II.B. 
 11 See infra Part III. 
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independence of audit committee members, the audit committee 
raises special concerns about fraud that cannot be completely re-
solved by an equity position alone.12  For its part, the SEC should 
modify its taxonomy if it maintains its current posture toward audit 
committee equity ownership.13
Following this introduction, Part II will discuss the statutory and 
regulatory background defining director independence, now codified 
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 193414 (“Exchange Act”) and 
SRO regulations.15  Part III explores the interrelationships of these 
materials and the resulting confusion about what role equity posi-
tions play in the abstract definitions of “independence,” and consid-
ers the effects that confusion can have on reporting companies and 
their investors.  Part IV describes the benefits of director equity own-
ership.  Finally, Part V proposes that, because significant equity own-
ership advances the SROs’ corporate governance goals, a director’s 
equity stake should not be considered when determining whether a 
director is independent.  It also demonstrates how this approach 
would be consistent with the existing regulatory framework and fur-
thers the SROs’ purposes for demanding independence. 
 12 Insofar as the SEC is concerned with independence from management, as the 
SROs are, the position this Comment takes with respect to SRO rules may well be 
equally applicable to the SEC rules.  It is a tenuous position to take, however, to ar-
gue that the largest shareholders (i.e., the owners) should be overseeing manage-
ment as well as their own audit—an area that requires a level of detachment that an 
equity interest cannot provide.  See infra Part IV.  For an interesting perspective on 
the ineffectiveness of audit committee independence on financial statement quality, 
see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–33 (2005). 
 13 For example, the SEC could elect to replace “independent” with “outside” di-
rectors for the audit committee. “Outside” directors are defined as “nonemployee 
director[s] with little or no direct interest in the corporation.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 493 
(8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Cf. id. (an inside director is a “director who is also 
an employee, officer, or major shareholder of the corporation”) (emphasis added).  The 
concept of “outside directors” is not foreign to the SROs.  NYSE Manual, supra note 
7,  § 303.01 (“Since 1956 the Exchange has required all domestic companies listing 
on the Exchange to have at least two outside directors on their boards.”).  The new  
§ 303A provisions superseded the § 303 provisions that referenced outside directors, 
and they were removed on Sept. 9, 2005.  Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to the Deletion of Superseded Corporate Governance Standards, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-52396, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,430, 54,430 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
 14 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 15 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A; NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7,  
§ 4200(a)(15). 
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II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF  
DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 
This Part provides a background on the differing approaches to 
director equity ownership taken by Sarbanes-Oxley, the SROs, and 
traditional court analyses.  Consistent with the SEC’s charge to pre-
vent market fraud perpetrated through inaccurate corporate disclo-
sures,16 Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to require audit committees 
to be composed solely of independent directors to oversee the audit 
of those disclosures.17  In assuming their broader role in corporate 
governance,18 the SROs require a majority of independent directors 
on the board and exclusively independent directors on the nominat-
ing and compensation committees.19  Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
SROs prescribe minimum criteria to be met before a director may be 
considered “independent.”20  These objective definitions depart from 
traditional notions of independence insofar as they attempt to define 
independence in the abstract, rather than in context as a court would 
do.21  While bright-line rules are favored for providing certainty for 
those who plan around them,22 the differing standards prescribed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SROs introduce their own ambiguity about 
what role equity ownership by directors, historically viewed as a posi-
tive incentive to monitor corporate activity, should play in the inde-
pendence analysis under the new regulations. 
To follow this Comment’s use of “equity,” it is important to rec-
ognize that stock is usually comprised of two features—an equity in-
terest and a voting interest.  Equity interest generally means a prop-
erty (or financial) interest in a company that is typically associated 
 16 See infra Part V; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (2002) (“An Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reli-
ability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m). 
 18 See infra Part V. 
 19 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, §§ 303A.01, .04–.05. 
 20 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m), with NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A, and 
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4200(a)(15). 
 21 See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
This contextual approach is a strength of our law, as even the best 
minds have yet to devise across-the-board definitions that capture all 
the circumstances in which the independence of directors might rea-
sonably be questioned.  By taking into account all circumstances, the 
Delaware approach undoubtedly results in some level of indetermi-
nacy, but with the compensating benefit that independence determina-
tions are tailored to the precise situation at issue. 
Id.  
 22 Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 596 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A bright-
line rule brings clarity and predictability . . . .”). 
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with most benefits of stock ownership,23 although the term “equity” 
can also be used as a synonym for a share of stock.24  A voting interest 
generally attaches to an equity interest,25 although voting and equity 
are severable concepts26 that permit corporations to issue shares with 
non-proportional voting rights.27  This Comment uses the term “eq-
uity” to mean stock comprised of an equity interest and a propor-
tional voting right.28
A. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Rules Pursuant to It 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact on director independence has been 
limited to those directors who serve on a company audit committee 
that is responsible for overseeing the company auditors.29  Those pro-
visions are embodied in Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act,30 
and direct the SEC to create rules that prohibit any company not in 
compliance with that section from being listed on a national ex-
change.31  Pursuant to that directive, the SEC defined independence 
in Rule 10A-3.32
 23 Cf. Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Com-
pensation to Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-
Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1016 (2004) (describing how the bene-
fits derived by ensuring substantial equity ownerships could be advanced by requiring 
directors to retain stock received under compensation agreements). 
 24 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (8th ed. 2004) (equity is “[a]n ownership interest 
in property, esp[ecially] in a business,” but can also mean “[a] share in a publicly 
traded company”). 
 25 CHESTER ROHRLICH ET AL., ORGANIZING CORPORATE & OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES § 3.02[2] (6th ed. 2007) (“When financing takes the form of classic ‘eq-
uity,’ the investor ordinarily obtains some control powers, including some voting 
power . . . .”). 
 26 See Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder 
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing 
Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725, 
754 (1995) (“[Delaware] Code recognizes the difference between voting and equity 
interest by providing separate means of protection for the two interests . . . .”). 
 27 Frank Partnoy, Robert Clark’s Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Change: Financial In-
novation in Corporate Law, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 799, 811 (2006) (“[C]orporations issue 
multiple classes of equity, with different voting or dividend rights . . . .”). 
 28 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975) (defining the 
five general characteristics of stock as embodying (1) the right to receive dividends, 
(2) negotiability, (3) ability to hypothecate, (4) “voting rights in proportion to the number 
of shares owned” and (5) the ability to appreciate in value (emphasis added)). 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2)–(3) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 30 Id. § 78j-1. 
 31 Id. § 78j-1(m)(1). 
 32 Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-
3(b)(1)(ii) (2006).  The following discussion is confined to non-investment compa-
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Without affirmatively defining what an independent director is, 
the SEC has provided some objective criteria specifying what an in-
dependent director is not.  Rule 10A-3 provides that to be considered 
independent, a director cannot accept any “consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory” fees from the company other than in the direc-
tor’s capacity as a board or committee member.33  Likewise, the direc-
tor may not “be an affiliated person of” the company, other than in 
the director’s capacity as a board or committee member.34  Executive 
officers, employees, general partners, and managing members of af-
filiate entities are deemed “affiliates” based solely on their relation-
ship with the affiliated entity.35
A director who owns substantial equity in the company he serves 
might be disqualified from being independent under Rule 10A-3 if 
his equity position gives him the status of “affiliate.”  The term “affili-
ate” itself is defined as a person who “controls, or is controlled by, or 
is under common control with,” the company.36  “Control” is defined 
as the power to direct management, “whether through the ownership of 
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”37  Thus by owning a sub-
stantial equity position in the company, a director might be disquali-
fied from being independent because his equity position provides 
control of the company, earning him the status of “affiliate” in a ca-
pacity other than as a board or committee member.38
Recognizing the potential disqualifying effect of equity owner-
ship,39 the SEC provided a safe harbor threshold under which any 
person (other than an executive officer) who is a beneficial owner of 
ten percent or less of the voting equity securities of a company is 
nies, although similar rules exist for investment companies.  See id. § 240.10A-
3(b)(1)(iii). 
 33 Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(iii). 
 36 Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1).  When used elsewhere in the act, “affiliate” is given the 
meaning assigned under the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(19) 
(2000); see also id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A)) (defining “affiliated person” to include a person 
who holds five percent of the company’s voting securities). 
 37 Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(4) 
(emphasis added). 
 38 See id.  “Equity position,” as used in this Comment, means beneficial ownership 
of company equity.  Note that additional criteria, not inconsistent with those under 
the SRO regulations, will presume affiliate status, such as employment by the com-
pany or employment by another affiliate of the company.  Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(iii). 
 39 See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act 
Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,793 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
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deemed not to be in control of the company.40  This safe harbor pro-
vision expressly disavows any presumption of affiliate status for per-
sons exceeding the threshold.41  A director who exceeds this thresh-
old, however, is not entitled to the safe harbor presumption.42  For a 
director outside the threshold, the board will have to perform a facts 
and circumstances analysis to determine whether that director has 
“control” over the company.43
B. SRO Regulations 
The SRO regulations require that the audit committee members 
also meet the SROs’ independence tests,44 but add additional re-
quirements for the board and establish membership requirements for 
committees other than the audit committee.45  For example, the 
NYSE requires that a majority of the board members be inde-
pendent46 and that the board has both a compensation and a nomi-
nating committee comprised entirely of independent directors.47  
Members of the compensation committee set the compensation levels 
for executives,48 while the nominating committee members are 
charged with nominating new directors and recommending corpo-
rate governance guidelines to the board.49
 40 Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(1)(ii)(A)(1).  Beneficial ownership is determined 
under Regulation 13D.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.  A beneficial owner is one who has vot-
ing or investment power over shares of the company, through any relationship.  Id. 
 41 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(B). 
 42 Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1). 
 43 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Re-
lease Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,793. 
 44 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.07(b). 
 45 See id. § 303A; see also NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4200(c).  Although the 
NYSE and the Nasdaq rules are substantially similar, the NYSE rules are arguably 
more stringent in certain respects.  Compare NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.05 
(requiring companies to have a compensation committee), with NASDAQ Manual, 
supra note 7, § 4350(c)(3) (allowing compensation of officers to be determined by a 
compensation committee or by a majority of independent directors; a special com-
mittee is not required).  For this reason, this Comment will focus on the NYSE rules, 
but will address the Nasdaq rules where they evince a departure that is material to 
the discussion.  Note that the SRO regulations address audit committee independ-
ence insofar as they require, at a minimum, compliance with the SEC rules.  NYSE 
Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06 (requiring compliance with SEC Rule 10A-3); accord 
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(d) (same); see also NYSE Manual, supra note 
7, § 303A.07 (providing additional criteria such as a requirement of three independ-
ent directors on the audit committee) (emphasis added). 
 46 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01. 
 47 Id. §§ 303A.04–.05. 
 48 Id. § 303A.05. 
 49 Id. § 303A.04. 
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The NYSE regulations, like the SEC rules, do not define what an 
independent director is, but instead require the board to “affirma-
tively determine[] that the director has no material relationship with 
the listed company.”50  Once identified, independent directors and 
the criteria used to select them must be disclosed in the company 
proxy or Form 10-K.51  The regulations set out some objective criteria 
that will defeat independence, for example, employment by the 
company within the last three years, payments to the director or a 
family member exceeding $100,000 over three years (other than 
payments for their capacity as a director), and certain relationships 
with the company auditor.52  The regulations are primarily concerned 
with independence from management and maintain that ownership 
of even “a significant amount of stock, by itself,” will not bar an inde-
pendence finding.53
In their original version of proposed regulations, the SROs took 
the position that an absolute limit of twenty percent stock ownership 
would apply to audit committee members.54  Under the proposed 
regulations, a person who held, or was associated with a person who 
held, twenty percent or more of the company’s stock could not sit as 
a voting member of the audit committee.55  No similar threshold was 
proposed for the other committees.56  These proposed regulations 
were ultimately dropped, and the final regulations instead defer to 
the SEC audit committee requirements57 and, in addition, require 
compliance with the general SRO independence requirements pro-
vided for the board and other committees.58
C.  Traditional Court Analysis 
Providing a much less complex framework, the independence 
inquiry under Delaware law has always been a contextual assessment.  
When determining whether a director was independent in a given 
situation, Delaware courts will review whether a director’s decision 
was “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board,” 
 50 Id. § 303A.02. 
 51 Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
 52 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02. 
 53 Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt. (emphasis added). 
 54 NYSE, Inc., REPORT OF THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING 
STANDARDS COMMITTEE 11 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
corp_govreport.pdf. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06. 
 58 Id. § 303A.07(b). 
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or whether it was based on “extraneous considerations or influ-
ences.”59  This case-by-case approach is embodied in the “business 
judgment rule,” a product of common law that affords directors a 
presumption that they acted in “the best interests of the company.”60
The Delaware approach results in a far more open-ended in-
quiry.  Rather than provide an abstract definition, the independence 
inquiry begins by determining from what or whom the director 
should be independent, and for what purpose, and then evaluates the 
director’s relationship with that person or entity.61  At the core of the 
inquiry, Delaware courts will consider a director as not independent 
if he is, “for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision” 
solely in the best interests of the company.62  For example, where a 
director must be independent from a director with a personal inter-
est in a transaction, the director may not be independent if he is “be-
holden,” or obliged, to the interested director.63  “Beholden” encom-
passes more than financial obligations and can include personal and 
other relationships.64  Close personal relationships that border on 
family ties,65 colleagueship outside of the board, and even a prior pro-
fessor-student relationship have come into the equation.66  Naturally, 
such a review can only be transaction-dependent and contextual inso-
far as it is used to review specific relationships of a director in the 
context of reviewing specific actions of the board. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF INCONGRUOUS INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS 
This Part will discuss how the competing approaches of the SRO 
regulations and securities laws, despite providing some objective cri-
teria, create ambiguity about how director equity ownership factors 
into an independence determination.67  Indeed, “[t]he lack of any se-
rious underlying theory of independent director motivation is star-
 59 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984). 
 60 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (citing 
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)). 
 61 See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004). 
 62 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 63 Id. at 938–39. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050. 
 66 In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 942. 
 67 Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 157 (2006) (“While ‘independence’ has generally proven fairly 
easy to conceptualize, if more difficult to define in precise legislative language, one 
area in which substantial disagreement exists even in principle is that of the signifi-
cance to be given to stock ownership by the putatively independent director.”). 
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tlingly manifest.”68  This uncertainty can have the effect of dissuading 
venture capitalists, mutual fund managers, and other investors with 
substantial equity stakes from confidently asserting their independ-
ence and serving crucial roles on the board.69  Depriving young com-
panies of the management expertise of venture capitalists in an era 
where initial public offerings are increasingly backed by venture capi-
tal, and indeed some industries are predominantly financed by such 
capital,70 can inhibit growth and ultimately shareholder value.71  
Moreover, venture capitalists, mutual and pension fund managers, 
and other institutional representatives constitute a substantial pool of 
managerial talent that could contribute independent directors to 
corporate boards and improve corporate governance.72  Yet these 
corporate backers are left to operate in an uncertain framework,73 an 
 68 Id. at 160. 
 69 See Letter from Mark G. Heesen, President, National Venture Capital Associa-
tion, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (May 8, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/ 
rules/sro/nyse200233/nationalven050803.htm (Commenting on the proposed SRO 
regulations, Mr. Heesen stated that the National Venture Capital Association “is par-
ticularly sensitive to the risk that new definitions of director independence in the 
Proposed Rules could have the unfortunate effect of limiting the ability of venture 
capitalists to serve on audit and compensation committees.”). 
 70 Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Ini-
tial Public Offering, 46 J.L. & ECON. 569, 572–73 (2003). 
 71 See James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy: Designing a Plan for Strategic, 
Effective, Efficient Giving, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 34 (2003) (Venture capi-
talists “add value through the depth of their engagement by bringing expertise to the 
board, making valuable connections, recruiting and mentoring management talent.”  
They condition additional investments “upon demonstrating progress toward per-
formance measures that will lead to long-term growth.”). 
 72 William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Views from the Bench: The New Feder-
alism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents 
of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 992–96 (2003); Heesen, supra note 69 (“[A] 
recognition of the independence of directors who represent large venture capital 
shareholdings is critical to the effectiveness of these Proposed Rules in populating 
boards and committees with experienced, financially savvy, independent directors.”). 
 73 MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND 
THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 7–8, 77 (2007), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. In a report commissioned 
by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer, McKinsey & Com-
pany interviewed financial services industry executives and investor groups, and 
worked with experts on financial regulations to assess their views on maintaining U.S. 
financial services leadership.  Id.  A strong concern arising out of this research is the 
perceived legal unpredictability caused by the “inherent complexity” of the U.S. 
regulatory framework.  Id.  “[T]he system’s inherent complexity has the unfortunate side 
effect of making it harder to manage legal risk in the US than in many other jurisdictions. . 
. . Legal experts indicated that this is a major reason why many corporations now 
choose English law to govern their international commercial contracts.”  Id. (empha-
sis added). New York’s legislature encourages businesses to select New York as their 
forum. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (Consol. 2006) (permitting 
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undesirable consequence in view of the positive role director equity 
ownership plays in corporate governance.74
What dissuades these various actors is threefold.  First, the most 
generous consequences of a failure to comply with SRO listing re-
quirements are suspension and removal from the exchange.75  Sec-
ond, in contrast to Delaware’s contextual assessment, companies 
must disclose which directors are independent and how the determi-
nation of their independence status was made in the company’s an-
nual proxy statement or Form 10-K filed with the SEC.76  Such disclo-
sures, in advance of any alleged wrongdoing, could subject the 
company to SEC scrutiny and liability (and, some would argue, vexa-
tious lawsuits77) under the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange 
Act.78  Third, the SRO independence status of a director, determined 
in a transaction-independent context, may be unfairly extended to 
assessments of independence in judicial review of a director’s deci-
sions,79 where the courts have historically eschewed categorization be-
fore considering why a director should be independent and from 
whom the director should be independent.80
The cause of this uncertainty comes from the interrelationship 
of SEC and SRO regulations and how they address director equity 
ownership.  The ambiguity begins with the audit committee require-
ments and the ten percent voting stock threshold created by the non-
affiliate safe harbor under the SEC rules,81 and the uncertain import 
of failing to be within the threshold.  Delaware jurists William Chan-
choice of New York law or choice of New York forum for transactions unrelated to 
New York but “covering, in the aggregate,” $250,000 for choice of law or $1,000,000 
for forum selection). 
 74 See generally infra Part IV. 
 75 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 801.00. 
 76 Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
 77 BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 73, at 100–01, 104 (discussing the preva-
lence of “meritless” lawsuits and the pressure it puts on companies to settle and avoid 
the high costs of litigation). Former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, whose widely 
recognized work fighting Wall Street firms as New York’s attorney general helped 
earn him his position as governor, threw his support behind the report.  Aaron Luc-
chetti, Why Spitzer Is Backing Study That Endorses Less Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 
2007, at C3. 
 78 See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2006) (providing liabil-
ity for false or misleading statements of material fact in corporate disclosures). 
 79 Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 998 (asserting that, where traditional in-
dependence inquiries are transaction specific, courts must be cautious not to rest 
their independence inquiry on the status assigned by the regulations). 
 80 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004). 
 81 Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1) 
(ii)(B) (2006). 
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dler and Leo Strine posited that that the ten percent threshold acts as 
a per se bar to qualification of a director whose beneficial ownership 
exceeds that level from serving on the audit committee82 because of 
the negative implication of not being able to claim the safe harbor.  
Indeed, many commentators to the proposed rule were also con-
cerned that a fixed level would raise a presumption of non-
independence.83  In response to these concerns, the SEC now ex-
pressly disavows such a presumption in the Rule itself,84 but it cannot 
be denied that as a result of this threshold, a director with a large eq-
uity position has a “taint that, at best, can be explained away,” even if 
only for audit committee purposes.85  The possibility remains that a 
director who might otherwise be independent will be disqualified 
from serving on the audit committee solely because of his equity posi-
tion.  This possibility suggests that at some point, a director is no 
longer independent for audit committee purposes when he or she 
exceeds some indeterminate threshold of beneficial ownership.86
This “taint” might affect the independence analysis under the 
SRO regulations where a director would also assert his or her inde-
pendence.  Key corporate functions are performed by nomination 
and compensation committees that must be comprised of entirely in-
dependent directors,87 and indeed the board itself must be comprised 
of a majority of independent directors.88  If this taint carries over to 
the analyses under the SRO regulations, board membership itself may 
be foreclosed to beneficial owners of large equity positions. 
In applying the same independence requirements to the board 
as they do to the audit committee, the SROs further blur the lines be-
tween these two regimes,89 making it difficult to disentangle the 
meaning of independence in one context from its meaning in the 
other.  The SROs, of course, require that audit committees comply 
 82 Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 990–91.  William Chandler and Leo Strine 
are Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, respectively, of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery.  Id. at 953. 
 83 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Re-
lease Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,793 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
 84 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(ii)(B). 
 85 Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 989–90. 
 86 See Clarke, supra note 67, at 158 (“Congress . . . could be seen as viewing sub-
stantial ownership of securities as undesirable in independent directors.”). 
 87 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, §§ 303A.04–.05 (2006). 
 88 Id. § 303A.01. 
 89 Id. § 303A.07(b) (“In addition to any requirement of Rule 10A-3(b)(1), all au-
dit committee members must satisfy the requirements for independence set out in 
Section 303A.02.”). 
FARANO_FINALV2 4/11/2008  10:48:59 AM 
2008] COMMENT 765 
 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley independence requirements.90  The di-
lemma is that the SROs also require the audit committee members to 
be independent under the SRO regulations.91  Thus a director on the 
audit committee must be independent under both Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the SRO regulations.92  A director on the compensation commit-
tee, however, need only qualify under the SRO regulations—and may 
so qualify even though, under Sarbanes-Oxley, he may be disqualified 
from sitting on the audit committee because of a large equity stake.93  
The result is a system in which a director on the audit committee is 
independent under the same SRO regulations as a director who is 
not independent for audit committee purposes, yet the SROs would 
label both directors “independent” and both must pass the same SRO 
independence tests.  While not purporting to place emphasis on 
stock ownership, the NYSE regulations do suggest that stock owner-
ship is at least a factor that adversely affects an independence deter-
mination by stating that stock ownership will not by itself preclude in-
dependence.94  Adding to the uncertainty is the SROs’ hostility 
toward significant equity ownership in their initial recommendation 
of a twenty percent threshold for audit committee membership.95  Yet 
all these indications of similarity between the seemingly firm  
Sarbanes-Oxley approach and the SRO approach are at odds with the 
NYSE’s claim that it “does not view ownership of even a significant 
amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independence finding.”96  In 
addition, although the SRO independence requirements also apply 
to the audit committee, the fact that the SRO requirements are “in 
addition” to the SEC requirements suggests that they supply some dif-
ference.97  What results is simply an unclear position on equity owner-
ship. 
 90 Id. § 303A.02(a). 
 91 Id.  Not without good reason—much of the additional objective criteria under 
SRO regulations are well reasoned, e.g., transaction-based prohibitions, id. § 
303A.02(b)(v), and not as clearly delineated in the SEC regulations.  See Listing 
Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii) (2006). 
 92 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.07(b). 
 93 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 94 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. (“[T]he Exchange does not 
view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an inde-
pendence finding.”) (emphasis added). 
 95 NYSE, INC., REPORT OF THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING 
STANDARDS COMMITTEE 11 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
corp_govreport.pdf. 
 96 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
 97 Id. § 303A.07(b). 
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This uncertainty about the role of equity ownership might dis-
courage venture capitalists, who often seek board representation,98 
from participating in corporate governance because their equity stake 
makes them uncertain candidates for “independent” roles under the 
regulatory framework.  A poignant example can be found in a recent 
proxy statement filed with the SEC, in which the company indicated 
that three directors would not be independent under NYSE stan-
dards, based solely on their affiliate status under SEC Regulations, 
because their employment with a private equity fund gave them a 
large beneficial ownership in the company.99
The confusion is not simply a product of the regulatory lan-
guage, but is also fueled by advocacy groups that simultaneously 
promote and condemn director share ownership.  In a less than clear 
position on equity ownership, Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), a leading proxy advisement firm that provides guidance to in-
stitutional holders on how to vote their proxies,100 internally classifies 
a director who beneficially owns ten percent or more voting or equity 
stock as a “Non-Independent Non-Executive Director” in its interna-
tional voting guidelines;101 yet, in its U.S. voting guidelines, ISS sets 
the threshold at fifty percent beneficial ownership of the companies 
voting shares before being considered an “Inside Director.”102  While 
these conflicting guidelines make ISS’s position on a safe level of di-
rector equity ownership uncertain, ISS nonetheless maintains that di-
rectors should hold some equity in the companies they serve.103  Yet 
 98 Bruce Taragin, Venture Capital 101, at 4 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.blumbergcapital.com/white_papers/files/VC101.pdf, reprinted in JAY B. 
ABRAMS, HOW TO VALUE YOUR BUSINESS AND INCREASE ITS POTENTIAL 223–41 (2004) 
(“VCs are price sensitive, active investors who seek Board representation . . . .”). 
 99 Sterling Chemicals, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF14A), at 16 
(Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1014669/ 
000095012906002747/h33413ddef14a.htm.  The private equity fund Resurgence As-
set Management was the beneficial owner of a “substantial majority” of Sterling 
Chemicals’ securities. Id. 
 100 Alan Murray, Frustrated “Greens” Turn to Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., Jun. 7, 2006, at 
A2 (explaining that ISS “advises pension funds and other institutions on how to vote 
their corporate proxies”); Lingling Wei, Corporate Governance (A Special Report)—How 
Am I Doing? Peer-based Evaluations Are Moving Slowly into the Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
9, 2006, at R5 (stating that ISS is the nation’s largest proxy-advisory firm). 
 101 INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SVCS., ISS 2007 INTERNATIONAL PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES SUMMARY 6 (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/ 
2007InternationalSummaryGuidelines.pdf (international director classification, ef-
fective Feb. 1, 2007). 
 102 INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SVCS., ISS 2007 US PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 
10 (Dec. 15, 2006) (U.S. director classification, effective Feb. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007USSummaryGuidelines.pdf. 
 103 Id. at 15 (“[S]tock ownership on the part of directors is desired . . . .”). 
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just as under the audit committee requirements, at some point a di-
rector’s beneficial ownership disqualifies her from being considered 
independent, although exactly where that threshold is drawn in ISS’s 
view is not well defined.104  Considering the influence that ISS has 
over shareholder votes and management decisions,105 a more con-
crete position is certainly warranted. 
ISS is not alone in maintaining a confusing stance on director 
equity ownership.  Although taking a seemingly adamant position on 
relationships with significant shareholders, International Corporate 
Governance Network’s (ICGN) inconsistent position on share owner-
ship contributes to the uncertainty about what role equity should 
have.  ICGN, an international organization focused on promoting 
good corporate governance,106 disapproves of directors with relation-
ships to significant shareholders,107 while simultaneously encouraging 
director equity ownership.  ICGN promotes a board of directors who 
exercise independent judgment in the best interests of the corpora-
tion and presumes that directors who have relationships with large 
shareholders might be subject to influences extraneous to those of 
the corporation.108  In ICGN’s view, then, a director with a relation-
ship to a significant shareholder is never independent.109  Not unlike 
ISS, however, ICGN encourages director equity ownership and de-
mands that every corporation have a policy of director share owner-
ship for the purpose of aligning the interests of directors with those 
of the shareholders “in a meaningful way.”110
 104 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 105 Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1439 (2002) (“A recent study found that voting recommenda-
tions by the ISS against management proposals are usually decisive, and the firm’s 
stated views on a voting issue will often be critical as to whether management pursues 
the issue.”). 
 106 Sara Calian, Global Panel Targets Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at C16 
(explaining that ICGN’s membership “includes asset managers from the United 
Kingdom, other European nations, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Brazil—as well 
as large U.S. groups such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System” 
and represents approximately $10 trillion in assets); ICGN.org, About the Network, 
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/mission.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). 
 107 INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, STATEMENT ON GLOBAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES § 5.5 (Jul. 8, 2005), available at http://www.icgn.org/organi 
sation/documents/cgp/revised_principles_jul2005.php [hereinafter ICGN, GOVERN- 
ANCE PRINCIPLES] (setting out factors affecting independence, including relationships 
with large shareholders). 
 108 Id. §§ 5.4–.5. 
 109 Note that “relationship” encompasses beneficial owners.  Determination of 
Beneficial Owner, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2006). 
 110 ICGN, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, § 5.18. 
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The SROs’ “controlled company” exemptions create a paradox 
that further complicates the analysis.  A “controlled company” is a 
listed company in which an individual, group, or other company 
holds more than fifty percent of the voting power.111  Companies that 
qualify for the exemption are excluded from the independent direc-
tor requirements related to board and committee composition under 
the SRO rules.112  These exemptions recognize the right of majority 
shareholders to select directors and have control over key deci-
sions.113  The SROs added the exemptions in response to concerns 
that requiring a majority of independent directors would have ad-
verse consequences such as depriving rights of majority shareholders, 
foreclosing family-owned companies’ owners from board member-
ship, and discouraging venture capitalists from making a public offer-
ing.114  The exemptions have drawn sharp criticism, however, because 
they undermine the safeguards the regulations otherwise provide.115  
Indeed, a controlled company is largely exempt from compliance 
with the SROs’ independence rules.116  Whatever the merits of the 
exemption, its basis solely on beneficial ownership of voting shares 
seems to imply that a person holding fifty percent of the company 
could never qualify as independent.117  Yet this implication is at odds 
with the position taken elsewhere in the SRO rules that stock owner-
ship does not by itself bar an assertion of independence.118  Moreover, 
 111 NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(c)(5) (setting out the exemption un-
der Qualitative Listing Requirements for Nasdaq Issuers Except for Limited Partner-
ships); NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00 (setting out the exemption in the in-
troduction). 
 112 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00. 
 113 NASDAQ, Inc., IM-4350-4 Board Independence and Independent Committees 
(Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display 
.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1019.  Clearly this exemption is also important for 
parent companies.  Id. 
 114 NYSE, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to the NYSE’s Corporate Governance Rule Pro-
posals 24 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend1-04-09-03.pdf (set-
ting out the various concerns raised by commentators). 
 115 Deborah Solomon, Loophole Limits Independence—Dozens of Firms Use Exemption 
That Allows Them to Avoid Rules Mandating Board Structure, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2004, 
at C1 (“They also raise troubling issues at companies where a controlling shareholder 
may have substantial voting interest but a small economic stake, the critics say.”). 
 116 Even under the exemption, the SROs retain the requirement that independent 
directors must meet in regularly scheduled “executive sessions,” exclusive of non-
independent directors.  NASDAQ Manual, supra note 7, § 4350(c)(5); accord NYSE, 
Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00 (does not obviate section 303A.03 on executive ses-
sion). 
 117 See NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00. 
 118 Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
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it suspends whatever protection might otherwise have been afforded 
by the independence regulations.119
Uncertainty comes at a cost.120  While the SEC and the SROs 
should be applauded for providing objective criteria to evaluate di-
rector independence, the obfuscated role of equity ownership in 
these abstract definitions of independence is in need of some clarifi-
cation.  In restructuring their posture, the SROs should acknowledge 
the positive effects of director equity ownership. 
IV. THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE WITH EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
Director equity ownership, if it plays any role in the independ-
ence analysis, should be a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of inde-
pendence.  Independence is, of course, relative.121  Complete inde-
pendence can be achieved only through complete disinterest, that is, 
absence of a positive incentive to engage in the company—an unde-
sirable attribute for a director.122  
The SROs, however, want to ensure that the directors maintain 
independence from executive management.123  Managerial oversight 
is a pervasive theme of the SRO regulations that runs through the ob-
ligations of each of the required committees.124  Independence from 
management is best promoted by aligning the directors’ interests 
with those of the shareholders to ensure effective managerial over-
sight.  This section will discuss how that alignment has both histori-
cally and currently been achieved though director equity ownership. 
Insofar as independence has historically been a contextual as-
sessment,125 Delaware case law assessing independence is instructive.  
Delaware is considered to be “the most important state of incorpora-
tion in the United States,”126 and is the state of incorporation for a 
 119 Id. § 303A.00. 
 120 See BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 73, at ii. 
 121 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004). 
 122 See Clarke, supra note 67, at 159–60 (stating that the purpose of having direc-
tors seems obscure if, in removing their ties to managerial interests, the regulatory 
framework neglects “to substitute a tie to the interests of any other constituency”).  
This result would leave no incentive to act in any predictable way, other than to avoid 
liability.  Id. 
 123 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
 124 Id. §§ 303A.04–.05, .07. 
 125 See supra Part II.C. 
 126 Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Re-
ality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396 (2003); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence 
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1782 (2002) (“Delaware 
[is] by far the most successful state in the incorporation marketplace . . . .”). 
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majority of public companies.127  Moreover, most states look to Dela-
ware for corporate law precedents.128
Recent Delaware case law continues to affirm the positive role 
that equity ownership plays in keeping directors independent from 
management by aligning their interests instead with the shareholders.  
For example, in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,129 when Oracle 
failed to make its quarterly projections, the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery refused strict disgorgement liability for an officer who traded 
while in possession of information that cast doubt on Oracle’s ability 
to make those projections.130  The refusal, the court said, was based in 
part on a concern that strict liability would “raise the barriers that al-
ready dissuade large, but not controlling, stockholders from serving 
on company boards”131 because it would make it more difficult for a 
director to trade in the company stock.  The court emphasized that 
having “as Ross Perot would say, ‘skin in the game’”132 by owning 
company stock aligns insiders’ interests with those of the sharehold-
ers, a result that Delaware courts encourage.133
The Oracle court surveyed a number of other Delaware decisions 
where equity ownership lent credence to a director’s judgment be-
cause it aligned his interests with those of the shareholders.134  For 
example, in Unitrin v. American General Corp.,135 the Supreme Court of 
Delaware reasoned that outside directors who were substantial stock-
holders could not be presumed to value their board positions greater 
than their economic interests as stockholders when voting in a proxy 
contest.136  In such a contest, said the court, the stockholder-directors 
have the same interests as the general stockholders: maximizing the 
 127 Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Management and Control of the Modern Business Cor-
poration: Executive Compensation and Takeovers: Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 780 n.74 (2002); Richard 
A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 
56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 806 (2004). 
 128 Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 625, 663 n.200 (2004); see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings 
and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 903 (2002). 
 129 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, No. 561, 2005 Del. LEXIS 150 (Del. Apr. 
14, 2005). 
 130 Id. at 929–30. 
 131 Id. at 931. 
 132 Id. at 930. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 930 n.116. 
 135 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 136 Id. at 1380–81. 
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value of their investment.137  Similarly, in In re Pennaco Holdings, Inc.,138 
the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, despite the prospect of a 
substantial severance package for a change in control of the com-
pany, the corporate officers, who were also some of the largest share-
holders, were unlikely to favor a sub-par takeover offer just to cash in 
on their severance packages.139  Implicitly, the court reached this re-
sult because the officers’ interests as equity holders were bound to be 
greater than their personal interests in their severances.140  Moreover, 
in response to a separate challenge of the board’s stock option grant 
to itself, the court explicitly stated that such a grant served the per-
missible purpose of aligning the interests of the board with those of 
the shareholders.141
In the merger context, while assessing an alleged breach of the 
board’s duty of loyalty in entering into a preferential transaction with 
a pension trust in order to secure the pension trust’s support of the 
merger, the court in IXC Communications Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc.142 
found that the interests of directors with substantial stock ownership 
would likely be aligned with all of the company shareholders.143  This 
lent credibility to the board’s decision to enter the agreement where, 
absent some other showing of self-interest, the challenged transaction 
was not shown to be inconsistent with the interests of all the share-
holders.144
In addition to the courts, Congress has acknowledged the im-
portant role that equity plays in ensuring that the interests of share-
holders are paramount.  Congress recently passed the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995145 (PSLRA), which creates a 
presumption in Exchange Act class action suits that the most ade-
quate lead plaintiff is the person with the largest financial interest in 
the action.146  This presumption can be rebutted only by showing that 
 137 Id. at 1380. 
 138 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 139 Id. at 709. 
 140 See id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999). 
 143 Id. at *17–*18. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (1995). 
 146 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000). 
[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff 
in any private action . . . is the person or group of persons that[, in ad-
dition to filing requirements and otherwise being eligible under Fed-
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the person would not fairly protect the interests of the class, or that 
the person is subject to unique defenses that might detract from his 
ability to serve the class adequately.147
PSLRA presents a situation analogous to the role of directors in 
their oversight of corporate management.  PSLRA was enacted to 
provide oversight of lawyers in securities class actions, where lawyers 
were perceived as managing the litigation unchecked and serving 
their own interests.148  Much like the previously extant corporate gov-
ernance regulatory framework was perceived as failing to constrain 
self-interested management,149 the rules of professional conduct were 
seen as ineffective in constraining plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities 
class actions.150  Congress touted the PSLRA for putting investors with 
significant financial interests in charge of their cases,151 acknowledg-
ing that shareholders with more to gain or lose will best serve the in-
terests of shareholder classes in exercising oversight.152
Financial theory also provides sound support for the aligning ef-
fects of equity interest.  Agency costs are a widely accepted theory on 
the result of differing interests between management and sharehold-
ers.153  Agency costs in the corporate context are the sum of (1) the 
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23] . . .  in the determination of the court, 
has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class . . . . 
Id. 
 147 Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).  This is akin to the “no material relationship with” 
the company portion of the SRO independence test.  NYSE Manual, supra note 7,  
§ 303A.02(a). 
 148 See 141 CONG. REC. S9199, S9212 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici) (“[U]nder this reform lawyers are going to represent a class of people, 
not a select plaintiff that they choose as pet plaintiffs. Lawyers are going to be more 
responsible to the courts . . . .”). 
 149 Kathleen F. Brickey, White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative Perspective: The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 246 (2004). 
 150 Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Insti-
tutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2065 (1995); see also Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 724 (2002) (discussing the potential 
for excess lawyer control, inability of shareholders to monitor class counsel, and in-
ability of courts to handle potential abuse through settlement review). 
 151 141 CONG. REC. S9199, S9212 (statement of Sen. Domenici) (“First, it puts in-
vestors with real financial interests, not lawyers[,] in charge of the case. It puts inves-
tors with real financial interests, not professional plaintiffs with one or two shares of 
stock[,] in charge of the case.”). 
 152 141 CONG. REC. S8885, S8893 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D’Amato) (“This bill says the institutional investors, the people who have billions in 
pension funds, the retirees, those managers will have a greater stake in the case.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV., 323–29 (1986), available at http://www.business.ecu 
.edu.au/users/dallen/corporatefinance3/jensenfreecashflow.pdf (discussing con-
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costs of monitoring management, (2) the costs incurred by the com-
pany in instituting its own compliance control and ascertaining the 
desires of the shareholders, and (3) the costs of a loss in value for the 
shareholders for inevitable deviations from the ideal course of ac-
tion.154  Agency costs arise from a divergence in interests between 
stockholders and management where there is a “separation of owner-
ship and control,”155 with stockholders retaining ownership but man-
agement retaining control.  To acknowledge the existence of agency 
costs is to acknowledge that without the common interest created by 
equity ownership, divergent interests can impede shareholders’ in-
terests and value.156  Introducing equity ownership at the managerial 
oversight level (the board of directors) provides the incentive to en-
sure shareholders’ interests are served.  Said another way, “non-
management directors are there to help shareholders solve the 
agency problem.”157  Indeed, many respected commentators agree 
that an equity interest can mitigate agency costs by “inducing man-
agement to care about shareholder interests.”158  The NYSE itself 
states that the “governance rules implemented in 2003 and 2004 em-
power independent directors as representatives of shareholders.”159
The aligning effects of equity ownership raise unique theoretical 
concerns that are inconsequential when viewed with the purpose of 
independence under the SRO regulations, to wit, keeping the direc-
tors separate from management.160  One concern with finding large 
equity holders independent is the fear that a rift will form between 
flicts of interest between shareholders and managers over free cash-flow payment 
policies and how such conflicts can create agency costs). 
 154 See id. 
 155 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
 156 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 850 (2005) (“In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the 
interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, and man-
agement thus cannot be automatically counted on to take actions that would serve 
shareholder interests. As a result, agency costs that reduce shareholder value might 
arise.”). 
 157 Clarke, supra note 67, at 154. 
 158 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 850.  Lucian Bebchuk is the William J. Fried-
man and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and 
Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School.  Prof. 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk (last visited Feb. 
28, 2007).  He is a frequent commentator on corporate governance issues and an ad-
vocate for increased shareholder power in corporate governance.  See id. 
 159 NYSE, Inc., Investor Protection, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/about/ 
1045516499685.html (follow “Listed-Company Compliance” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2007) (emphasis added). 
 160 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
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long-term and short-term interests of different shareholders.161  Of 
particular concern is the short-term view of corporate prospects that a 
director associated with a venture capital fund might hold.162  This 
concern is echoed in positions such as that taken by ICGN, evident in 
its fear of extraneous influences on directors’ decisions by large 
shareholders.163  While intellectually appealing, the argument misses 
its mark in the SRO context because, even were such a rift to form, it 
would not detract from keeping directors separate from manage-
ment. 
Financial theory demonstrates that a long- versus short-term 
shareholder rift is unlikely because there is no opportunity for short-
term gains in valid corporate decision making.  At the outset, it is not 
at all clear—as a general proposition—that corporate actions favored 
by short-term shareholders will necessarily conflict with those favored 
by long-term shareholders.164  A fundamental principal of financial 
theory is that projects with a positive net present value (those with 
long-term value regardless of their duration) increase the current 
value of the firm to the benefit of both long-term and short-term 
shareholders.165  The obvious corollary is that projects with a poor or 
negative net present value (those which will cause a net loss or a poor 
return regardless of duration) reduce the current value of the en-
tity.166  With all projects—regardless of duration—priced into the pre-
 161 See Robert D. Kraus, Inevitable Conflicts?: When a Venture Capitalist Is a Director, 
BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 49–50, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
blt/2004-01-02/kraus.shtml. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 164 See Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 884. 
[C]onsider[ing] the potential costs that might be caused by sharehold-
ers with short horizons, such as institutional investors and traders that 
follow high-turnover strategies . . . [, i]t is far from clear that the gov-
ernance provisions favored by such shareholders would commonly de-
viate from those favored by long-term shareholders. If a governance ar-
rangement is widely viewed as detrimental to long-term share value, its 
long-run effect will likely be reflected in the company’s stock price 
when the arrangement is adopted, and thus the short-run effect of its 
adoption will likely be negative as well. 
Id. 
 165 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 23–24 (8th ed. 2006).  Net present value is a formula for deter-
mining the present value of a prospect of a known duration.  See id.  Because the net 
present value of undertaken projects are reflected in the current market value, re-
gardless of the project’s timeframe, having a short-term interest in holding an equity 
position does not diminish the need for taking a long-term view of corporate pros-
pects.  See id. 
 166 See id. 
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sent value of the entity, rational directors should not take a short-
term view, even if their motives are purely financial and short-term, 
because capital markets will discount the present market value of a 
firm based on a project’s long-term effect on the value of the com-
pany.167  Therefore, short-term decisions will be discounted in the 
present stock price, thwarting the ability to make quick changes and 
“cut and run” with a short-term gain. 
A more troublesome situation might arise when a director who is 
a venture capitalist, pension fund manager, or other significant inves-
tor faces an opportunity to sell the entity at a low price while under 
pressure to exit the investment by the fund he manages.168  The direc-
tor may favor voting for the transaction, although longer-term share-
holders may prefer to remain as an independent entity.169
While by no means an impossible scenario, the obvious rejoinder 
is that all shareholders have varying investment objectives which 
might affect their decision to sell or remain; their only consensus will 
be on their ultimate return on investment.170  It is equally likely that 
venture capitalists, pension fund managers, or other significant inves-
tors might be more interested in the long-term prospects of the firms 
for which they serve as directors.  Does their interest in the long term 
prospects, fueling their desire to vote against such a transaction, ren-
der their actions inappropriate?  A completely disinterested director 
 167 See id. at 350 (“[M]arket prices . . . impound all available information about the 
value of each security . . . .”). 
 168 Kraus, supra note 161, at 50. 
 169 Id.  Kraus discusses other hypothetical scenarios wherein the shareholder di-
rectors may have a “difference in viewpoint” with the common shareholders, particu-
larly where the directors hold preferred shares, and provides the thoughtful admoni-
tion to venture capitalists to be wary of these potential conflicts when seeking board 
positions, because of the risk of litigation that might challenge their decisions.  Id. at 
51.  This Comment takes no position on the advisability of seeking board representa-
tion given the potential liability for any decisions a director makes, but offers the re-
sponse that, as a practical matter, articulable conflicts can be made for seemingly any 
given set of facts.  See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) 
(“[D]oubt might arise either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly 
close or intimate personal or business affinity or because of evidence that in the past 
the relationship caused the director to act non-independently vis à vis an interested 
director.”).  Kraus does generally acknowledge, however, that a venture capitalist’s 
main objective is to maximize his return, a “principle [that] should resonate with the 
company itself as well as its other shareholders.”  Kraus, supra note 161, at 50. 
 170 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995).  See generally 
Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Con-
text of Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 811, 825–34 (1990) (discussing the com-
plexity that is introduced during a takeover bid because shareholders have different 
investment objectives and considering whether it is appropriate to distinguish among 
these objectives). 
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would have to make the same decision, but without the incentive that 
an equity position provides to ensure the best deal possible for all 
shareholders.171  Moreover, such a director would have only his per-
sonal interest in retaining his professional fees or other benefits of 
directorship,172 providing an incentive to remain entrenched that is at 
odds with shareholders who would support a fairly priced sale.173  
Simply put, there is no way to guarantee that every investor’s subjec-
tive desires will be met in every transaction; the best approximation of 
that end is to have the director’s interests aligned with the stockhold-
ers’ in the most meaningful way possible—an interest in securing a 
return on their investment. 
There is no argument that the “short-sighted venture capitalist” 
situation would be “pronounced” when the transaction proceeds 
might accrue solely to those investors, as preferred shareholders, and 
leave little or nothing for the common shareholders.174  Moreover, 
the possibility does not warrant an exclusion from directorship before 
the transaction occurs.  A significant body of law condemns such fi-
nancial self-interest,175 and this exact scenario is ably handled by the 
 171 Cf. Clarke, supra note 67, at 159–60. 
 172 Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Gov-
ernance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 870 (2003). 
For example, in many large public corporations, outside directors do 
have a nominal equity stake in the company, but receive far more sub-
stantial compensation in the form of annual fees, which often exceed 
$90,000, in exchange for attendance at a few board meetings per an-
num. Such a compensation system, of course, is wholly inadequate to 
promote the kind of personal incentive necessary to create an active 
board. 
Id. 
 173 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54 (Del. 1985) (ex-
plaining that when a corporation deals in its own stock, it may deal selectively with its 
shareholders, “provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary pur-
pose to entrench themselves in office”); see also Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., No. 
13656, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *31–*32 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) (finding that 
the “prestige and perquisites” of directorship, even absent a salary, could cause direc-
tors to “reject an excellent offer unless it includes this value in its ‘price parame-
ter’”), rev’d, 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995) (reversing on appeal because the 
directors, who were also substantial shareholders, could not be presumed to value their 
interest in their directorship over their own economic interest as shareholders). 
 174 Kraus, supra note 161, at 50. 
 175 See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 (Del. Ch. 2002).  An interest pre-
cluding application of the business judgment rule exists when (1) a director receives 
a benefit, (2) from the transaction, (3) “which is not generally shared with . . . the 
other shareholders of his corporation,” and (4) that benefit is materially significant 
to that director.  Id. 
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courts.176  It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a director 
would be more likely to be accused of having a financial self-interest.  
Where a personal conflict of interest exists, directors must demon-
strate the “entire fairness” of the transaction, or face severe personal 
liability for their actions.177
The short-term view concern might have more force in the con-
text of the audit committee, a situation which raises special concerns 
about short-sighted interests held by those charged with monitoring 
the adequacy of audit controls.178  In the audit committee situation, 
concerns about short-term interest may not be completely dissipated 
by an equity position, no matter how well aligned shareholder and di-
rector interests may be.  Without proper oversight by parties with no 
personal stake in the firm’s financial performance, creative account-
ing could escape review and temporarily inflate market value.179  As 
Enron investors lament, these types of fraudulent accounting prac-
 176 E.g., In re Tele-Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16470, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
206, at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (“Because a clear and significant benefit . . . ac-
crued primarily . . . to such directors controlling such a large vote of the corporation, 
at the expense of another class of shareholders to whom was owed a fiduciary duty, then a 
standard of entire fairness applies.” (emphasis added)); see also Blue Chip Capital 
Fund II L.P. v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 830, 834 (Del. Ch. 2006) (where plaintiffs 
alleged that defendant directors with preferred shares approved an asset valuation in 
an attempt to maximize the preferred shareholder profits, dismissed fiduciary claim 
without prejudice because a remedy lied in contract, but would permit the fiduciary 
claim if the contractual remedy were inadequate). 
 177 Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (cit-
ing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (“[D]irectors are required to 
demonstrate both their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness 
of transactions in which they possess a financial, business or other personal interest 
which does not devolve upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.”).  In 
such a situation the directors would be required to prove the “entire fairness” of the 
transaction, both as to price and as to procedure.  Id. 
 178 See generally Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Ex-
change Act Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,815 (Apr. 9, 
2003) (providing standards that relate to “the audit committee’s responsibility to se-
lect and oversee the issuer’s independent accountant; procedures for handling com-
plaints regarding the issuer’s accounting practices; the authority of the audit com-
mittee to engage advisors; and funding for the independent auditor and any outside 
advisors engaged by the audit committee”). 
 179 E.g., McClendon, supra note 23, at 974–75 (describing how Enron executives 
created an “illusion of exploding cash flow” and “capitalized on this manipulation” 
by acquiring stock under compensation plans and “disposing of those shares prior to 
the issuance of financial restatements that caused a dramatic decline in stock price”); 
Nathan Wilda, David Pays for Goliath’s Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on 
Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (Enron undertook “exten-
sive fraudulent accounting practices and business partnerships that inflated its stock 
price dramatically.  When Enron was forced to restate its earnings and account for 
the hidden liabilities, it reported enormous losses resulting in a free-falling stock 
price.”). 
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tices are not without their practitioners.180  Thus, the SEC’s hostility 
toward equity ownership by audit committee members may be justi-
fied. 
The concern echoed in the SRO amendments, however, is inde-
pendence from management.181  Independence from management is 
readily accomplished through ensuring director equity ownership 
and alignment with the shareholders’ interests.  From this perspec-
tive, the SROs should encourage directors to take a substantial equity 
stake in the corporations they serve.  Yet the ambiguity introduced by 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the recent amendments to the SRO regulations 
obfuscate the role that equity ownership plays.182  Thus, the SROs 
need to take a more firm position in favor of equity ownership in 
their independence criteria. 
V.  EQUITY OWNERSHIP SHOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON AN 
INDEPENDENCE ASSESSMENT 
The SROs should amend their objective criteria to affirm that 
equity ownership will not affect the independence assessment—no 
matter what ownership interest a director may have—and take a posi-
tion in the commentary that favors director equity ownership.  This 
change is supported by the SROs’ purposes in demanding director 
independence.  It could also improve corporate governance in gen-
eral by eliminating the need for the controlled company exemption, 
while retaining the general notion of independence embodied in the 
remainder of the requirements.183  Moreover, legislative history seems 
to suggest that the ambiguity the SROs created was not their original 
intention. 
This Part will discuss the general purposes of independence un-
der the SRO rules and demonstrate that this proposal is not only con-
sistent with the current regulatory scheme, but could also improve 
corporate governance generally by furthering the SROs’ stated goals.   
 180 See supra note 179; see also John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison—
Enron Ex-CEO Faced Longer Term for Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45 
Million, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1 (describing the recent sentencing of Jeffrey 
Skilling, the former Enron CEO, for his involvement in Enron’s frauds). 
 181 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. (2006). 
 182 See supra Part III. 
 183 E.g., NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02 (requiring an affirmative finding of 
independence by the board, prohibiting recent employment by the company, and 
other requirements). 
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A. Unintended Consequences 
Legislative history of the new regulations suggests that the SROs 
did not intend to give equity ownership a scarlet letter.184  The NYSE 
added commentary indicating that stock ownership alone was not a 
bar to independence in response to concerned venture capitalists 
and commentators who sought “clarification of the interaction be-
tween share ownership and independence.”185  In the SEC Release 
approving the proposed SRO regulations, the SEC took notice of a 
commentator who “expressed its strong support for the position 
taken by both the NYSE and Nasdaq not to disqualify independent 
directors for ownership of even a significant amount of stock.”186  
Thus, the drafters acknowledged the issue and, standing alone, 
seemed to have addressed it. 
It is the SROs’ regulatory interplay with the SEC, even in the ini-
tial approval process, that cast a sinister shadow on equity ownership.  
In paraphrasing the SRO position that the NYSE “does not view own-
ership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an 
independence finding,”187 the SEC release restates the position as 
“not necessarily a bar to an independence finding.”188  The SROs’ posi-
tion toward director equity ownership may not have been so unclear 
had their regulations never been juxtaposed with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
regulations. 
A simple change in SEC taxonomy might remedy some of the 
angst.  The SEC and SROs’ concurrent use of the term “independ-
ence” with different meanings under either scheme is a part of the 
problem.189  The statutory authority to create the audit committee 
rules does not require use of the term “independent.”190  As the new-
 184 Indeed, the NYSE acknowledges the value of equity ownership by directors and 
officers.  Id. § 309.00. 
 185 Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, 68 
Fed. Reg. 19,051, 19,061 (Apr. 17, 2003). 
 186 Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,169 (Nov. 12, 2003). 
 187 Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, 68 
Fed. Reg. at 19,053. 
 188 Id. at 19,061 (emphasis added). 
 189 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 190 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004).  Audit committee members must be 
members of the board of directors and “otherwise be independent.” Id. § 78j-
1(m)(3)(A).  “Independent” is only defined for purposes of the paragraph it is in. Id. 
§ 78j-1(m)(3)(B).  The SEC already provided for a different usage of the term “affili-
ate” in the new rule.  Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii) (2006).  “Affiliate” would otherwise have the meaning Congress 
FARANO_FINALV2 4/11/2008  10:48:59 AM 
780 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:753 
 
comer to the corporate governance regulatory field,191 the SEC 
should consider replacing “independent” with a term that more 
clearly differentiates the two regimes.192
Moreover, a change in the taxonomy would serve the preemi-
nent Sarbanes-Oxley goal: protecting investors by improving the ac-
curacy of corporate disclosures.193  Each director’s independence 
status and how that status was determined must be disclosed in a 
company’s proxy statement or Form 10-K.194  If the differing stan-
dards are not made clear to investors then the confusion this Com-
ment takes issue with will ultimately devolve to the public.195
B. The SRO Policies Favor Director Equity Ownership 
Although the SEC and the SROs share similar roles in the mar-
ketplace, the goals of the SROs’ new regulations address important 
areas other than those addressed by the SEC.  Like the SEC’s market 
oversight role,196 the SROs are charged with designing rules “to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, [and] to pro-
mote just and equitable principles of trade.”197  To that end, the SEC 
and the SROs share a common stance on audit committee member-
ship,198 which includes an apparent hostility toward those members 
gave it under the Investment Company Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(19).  “Independent” 
was not previously defined and should therefore be less constrained in its use.  See id. 
§ 78c(a). 
 191 Sarbanes-Oxley is an unprecedented shift into direct federal regulation of cor-
porate governance.  Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 42 (2004); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate 
Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2004); cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to 
“Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 
721, 744 (2005). 
 192 See supra note 13 (suggesting “outside” director as a suitable replacement based 
on the accepted definition of that term). 
 193 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (“An Act 
[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”). 
 194 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.02(a) cmt. 
 195 See supra Part III.  Note that the SEC’s and SROs’ respective positions on equity 
ownership are not their only inconsistent position.  Id.  While some overlap exists, 
there are some criteria under the SRO regulations that do not exist under SEC rules.  
Id. 
 196 See generally SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, 
MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION (Sept. 11, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
 197 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000). 
 198 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.06 (requiring compliance with Exchange 
Act Rule 10A-3, as mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A)). 
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with large equity stakes.199 Their common goal is to improve inde-
pendent review and to provide a check on a company’s financial con-
trols.200  However, the additional SRO regulations seem geared more 
toward their broader decree to perfect a “free and open market . . . 
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.”201  The 
reasoning underlying the SROs’ criteria for additional committees—
and the board itself—supports taking an approach favoring equity 
ownership. 
First, the SROs’ initial requirement mandates a board comprised 
of a majority of independent directors.202  The goal of this require-
ment is to increase the “quality of board oversight” and reduce con-
flicts of interest.203  The SROs serve each of these purposes by en-
couraging director equity ownership. 
Improved board oversight results from an active board, and eq-
uity ownership ensures an active board.  Like the SROs, commenta-
tors have criticized the boards of public companies for their “failure 
to engage in the kind of active management oversight that results in 
more effective corporate performance.”204  Commentators praise ac-
tive board involvement as a means of improving corporate perform-
ance and management accountability,205 leading companies to inno-
vate ways to stimulate a more active board.206  In empirical studies 
examining key indicators of board performance, equity ownership 
correlates with better management oversight and more effective 
 199 See supra Part IV. 
 200 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Re-
lease Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788, 18789 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
 201 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000); see also NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 301.00 
(“[C]onsistent with the Exchange’s long-standing commitment to encourage high 
standards of corporate democracy, every listed company is expected to follow certain 
practices aimed at maintaining appropriate standards of corporate responsibility, in-
tegrity and accountability to shareholders.”). 
 202 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01. 
 203 Id. § 303A.01 cmt. 
 204 E.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Manage-
ment Turnover, 54 BUS. LAW. 885, 891 (1999). 
 205 Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance 
of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1298, 1317–18 (dem-
onstrating a significant correlation between improved corporate performance and an 
“active, independent board” through observation of board activism).  See generally 
Kaja Whitehouse, Move Over, CEO: Here Come the Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at 
R1. 
 206 See Gaston Ceron, Musical Board Chairs: Some Companies Hope That by Rotating 
Lead Directors, They’ll Bring a Greater Array of Ideas to the Table; But This Approach Comes 
with a Price, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2004, at R5 (describing recent corporate practice of 
rotating key board positions among directors to increase director participation, de-
spite concerns about continuity in leadership). 
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boards.207  But to have such a desirable effect on director behavior, 
their equity ownership must be substantial.208  Thus, improvement of 
the “quality of board oversight” is achieved through encouraging sub-
stantial equity ownership. 
The SROs are also concerned about conflicts of interest.209  Eq-
uity ownership aligns a director’s interest with that of the sharehold-
ers,210 and reduces the director’s personal interest in her position.211  
The basic tenets of independence and equity ownership can be 
viewed as intertwined notions, each fueling the other.  Independence 
from management—as well as freedom from other personal or finan-
cial interests—ensure objectivity in oversight, while an equity stake 
ensures that the objectivity is exercised effectively.212  Absent equity 
ownership, directors’ motives are to collect their personal compensa-
tion and avoid liability—a virtual invitation to shirk performance and 
a conflict of interest in its own right.213  In stark contrast to equity 
ownership, having only personal compensation at stake might lead a 
director to value his position as director more than the performance 
of the company,214 a result at odds with the desire to reduce conflicts 
of interest.  In this view, “[i]ndependence and equity ownership, act-
ing in tandem, are the keys to effective corporate governance.”215  
Thus a board with a majority of directors having a substantial equity 
stake will achieve the SROs’ objectives in requiring a majority of in-
dependent directors by reducing the potential for conflicts of inter-
est, and increasing the quality of management oversight and corpo-
rate performance. 
Second, the SROs require listed companies to have a compensa-
tion committee comprised entirely of independent directors.216  The 
 207 E.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 204, at 921.  The authors use firm financial per-
formance and likelihood of CEO turnover during times of poor performance as in-
dications of effective board oversight.  Id. 885–90.  Based on a survey of 449 U.S. 
companies, the authors conclude that “better management monitoring and substan-
tial board equity ownership are correlated.”  Id. at 921. 
 208 Charles M. Elson et al., Corporate Governance Reform and Reemergence from Bank-
ruptcy: Putting the Structure Back in Restructuring, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1917, 1923 (2002); 
see Bhagat et al., supra note 204, at 919. 
 209 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.01 cmt. 
 210 See supra Part IV. 
 211 See Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995). 
 212 See Charles M. Elson, Enron and the Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 496, 498 (2004). 
 213 See id. 
 214 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1380–81. 
 215 Elson, supra note 212, at 499. 
 216 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.05. 
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compensation committee is responsible for reviewing corporate goals 
related to CEO compensation, reviewing the CEO’s performance, 
and determining the CEO’s compensation based on its evaluation, as 
well as recommending executive and other compensation plans and 
producing reports on executive compensation for inclusion in the 
company’s proxy statement.217  These duties require directors with in-
terests adverse to the executives to ensure that these decisions are 
based on merit rather than comity.  An equity position would ensure 
that directors’ interests are adverse to management’s on compensa-
tion issues.218  By increasing their ownership stake, directors will have 
every incentive to seek performance for the executives’ compensa-
tion, where directors with a minimal interest would be more yield-
ing.219  Making equity ownership synonymous with independence 
would further the SROs’ purpose in requiring an independent com-
pensation committee. 
Third, as they do for the compensation committee, the SRO 
regulations require a nominating committee comprised entirely of 
independent directors.220  The responsibilities of the nominating 
committee are to identify qualified persons to nominate for board 
membership, develop corporate governance guidelines, and oversee 
the evaluation of management and the board.221  As in other areas, 
those directors whose interests are aligned with the shareholders’ 
through equity ownership are more likely to act consistent with 
shareholders’ desires.222
 217 Id. § 303A.05(b)(i)(A)–(C). 
 218 Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation: A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. 
REV. 937, 982–83 (1993). 
Nowhere would the positive effect of a personally-motivated outside di-
rectorship be more evident than in the area of executive compensa-
tion.  Overcompensation is the result of ineffective bargaining.  People 
without great incentive to press for position rarely do.  Equity owner-
ship would align the position of the outside director with that of the 
group most disadvantaged by unreasonable compensation, the share-
holders. 
Id. 
 219 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 74 (2003) (stating that directors typically have only a 
nominal equity interest in the firm and thus have little incentive to fight the CEO on 
compensation issues); see also Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 991 (stating that 
venture capitalists with substantial equity positions have a strong incentive to monitor 
“managerial rent-seeking”). 
 220 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.04. 
 221 Id. § 303A.04(b)(i). 
 222 See supra Part IV. 
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Moreover, proposed corporate governance reforms evince a 
more general policy that encourages stock owners to be involved in 
the tasks performed by the nominating committee, in contrast to a 
policy of financially disinterested directors.  In recent years, commen-
tators have called for shareholder ability to directly initiate corporate 
governance reform in order to increase director accountability to 
shareholders.223  In fact, the SEC has considered a “direct access” rule 
that would permit shareholders owning five percent or more of the 
company to nominate directors, in certain circumstances.224  Such re-
forms, if enacted, would be difficult to square with a policy of denying 
nominating committee membership to large shareholders, who 
would presumably be able to nominate directors and initiate govern-
ance policy under those reforms. 
C. Advancing SRO Policy by Closing the Gaps 
If the SROs left equity ownership out of the independence de-
termination it would eliminate the need to suspend otherwise valid 
corporate governance reforms for companies falling under the con-
trolled company exemption.  “Controlled companies” are those com-
panies in which more than half of the voting power is concentrated in 
a person, group, or parent company.225  A company fitting this classi-
fication is exempt from compliance with the requirement of a major-
ity of independent directors as well as all of those related to the com-
pensation and nominating committees.226  By suspending these 
requirements for controlled companies the SROs defeat the sound 
policy goals served by the regulations’ enactment. 
The “controlled company” exemption introduces several issues.  
First, the exemption permits board and committee membership by 
any person, regardless of his or her ties to management or insider po-
sitions.227  This is contrary to the audit committee requirements which 
make no exemption for company size.228  Second, the threshold at 
 223 Bebchuk, supra note 156, at 884. 
 224 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, 68 
Fed. Reg. 60784, 60789-90 (Oct. 23, 2003) (discussing proposed Rule 14a-11 which 
would enable persons that have a five percent beneficial ownership to nominate a 
director when either a company nominee has received thirty-five percent “withhold” 
votes, or a prior proxy proposal for a “direct access” procedure received more than 
fifty percent support in a prior vote). 
 225 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Subject only to the audit committee requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley.  See 
NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00. 
 228 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Re-
lease Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,804 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
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fifty percent ownership seems in effect to be an arbitrary concession, 
as shareholders holding smaller fractions of ownership have similar 
rights, but no comparable protections exist for them.  Third, for per-
sons close to the threshold, it creates a perverse incentive simply to 
acquire or retain a voting position that exceeds the threshold to 
claim the exemption. 
The exemption also invites the potential for abuse, such as 
achieving the exemption through a firm capitalization that creates 
substantial voting interest in classes of shares held by the exemption-
seekers, where those persons have in fact only a minimal equity stake 
in the company.229  This structure provides complete voting control 
without the positive incentives attendant to equity ownership.  This is 
possible because the exemption applies to persons beneficially own-
ing voting shares, as opposed to simply “stock” or “equity.”230
Finally, other less flagrant means of circumventing the SRO 
regulations may have similar counterproductive results.  A basic ex-
ample is board stacking.  A director with a substantial equity stake 
who is dissuaded from asserting his independence might seek to in-
crease the board size to add an offsetting independent director, and 
not run afoul of the rule requiring a majority of independent direc-
tors.231  While within the confines of the regulations,232 board stacking 
is a problem in its own right; empirical evidence demonstrates that 
larger boards tend to harm firm performance.233  Leaving the SRO 
regulatory framework intact for all listed companies and acknowledg-
Section 10A(m) of the Exchange Act makes no distinction based on an 
issuer’s size.  As discussed in the Proposing Release, we think that im-
provements in the financial reporting process for companies of all sizes are im-
portant for promoting investor confidence in our markets.  In this regard, be-
cause there have been instances of financial fraud at small companies 
as well as at large companies, we think that improving the effectiveness 
of audit committees of small and large companies is important. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 229 See Solomon, supra note 115, at C1. (“They also raise troubling issues at com-
panies where a controlling shareholder may have substantial voting interest but a 
small economic stake, the critics say.”). 
 230 NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 303A.00. 
 231 Cf. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 
1112 (2005) (discussing board stacking in the context of takeover defenses and 
shareholder voting rights manipulation). 
 232 The regulations address classified boards, NYSE Manual, supra note 7, § 304.00, 
but do not set a limit on the total number of directors. 
 233 See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Deconstructing Sunbeam—Contemporary Issues in Corporate 
Governance, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting 
the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, 
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 293 (2004). 
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ing the positive effect that equity ownership has in ensuring inde-
pendence and performance eliminates these issues by permitting uni-
form application of SRO policy to all listed companies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory framework supplied by Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the SROs has introduced ambiguity into the definition of inde-
pendence for directors who own substantial blocks of company stock.  
In defining the contours of independence, the SEC and the SROs 
have taken inconsistent positions, placing an uncertain taint on direc-
tor equity ownership that runs counter to the traditional legal under-
standing of its role.234  While a change in SEC taxonomy could allevi-
ate some confusion, the SRO regulations need a shift in posture. 
Because equity ownership furthers their corporate governance 
objectives, the SROs should encourage equity ownership by all direc-
tors.235  Taking the strong position that equity ownership will not ad-
versely affect any finding of “independent” status under the SRO 
regulations would clarify the uncertain regulatory framework.  More-
over, this position would reduce or possibly eliminate the need for a 
controlled company exemption and other regulatory evasions, 
thereby ensuring that the rest of the regulations’ well reasoned crite-
ria are intact for those companies that would otherwise rely on the 
exemptions.  As a result, the SROs would more equitably further their 
regulatory objectives and restore equity ownership to its rightful posi-
tion as a positive incentive to ensure good corporate performance. 
 
 234 See Chandler & Strine, supra note 72, at 992. 
 235 See supra Parts IV–V. 
